This paper explores the proposal that there is a close link between counterfactual thinking and lying. Both require the imagination of alternatives to reality and we describe four studies which explore this link. In Study 1 we measured individual differences in both abilities and found that individuals with a tendency to generate counterfactual thoughts were also more likely to generate potential lies. Studies 2 and 3 showed that counterfactual availability influences people's ability to come up with lies and the extent to which they expect others to lie. Study 4 used a behavioural measure of deception to show that people tend to lie more in situations also known to elicit counterfactual thoughts. Overall, the results show that the imagination of alternatives to the past plays an important role in the generation of lies. We discuss the implications for the fields of counterfactual thinking and deception.
Introduction
Reconsidering our past decisions by wondering what could have been had we chosen differently is a common feature of human thought. The process of undoing past events is termed counterfactual thinking and is characterised by the mental simulation of alternatives to reality. By imagining how things could be different, counterfactual thinking helps us learn from past mistakes, set goals for the future and solve problems (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Smallman & Roese, 2009) . Our aim in this paper is to test the idea that imagining alternatives to the past may also be an important part of the process of generating lies.
1
Although the link between counterfactuals and deception has received little attention, some research points towards a positive association between these two processes. Like counterfactuals, lying about the past requires the generation of alternatives to reality which in both cases is achieved through mentally altering previous events (Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014; Malone, Adams, Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1997) and in both cases these changes tend to be minimal (Byrne, 2016; Vrij, Granhag, & Mann, 2010) .
Additionally, separate studies in the two areas suggest that the generation of both counterfactuals and deceit rely on the same core component processes of executive function such as inhibitory control and working memory (Drayton, Turley-Ames, & Guajardo, 2011; Gombos, 2006) . Age related changes to these executive functions are associated with a decrease in the frequency we engage in both deception and counterfactual thinking (Debey, De Schryver, Logan, Suchotzki, & Verschuere, 2015; Walsh, Deeprose & Briazu, in preparation). This can be linked to prefrontal lobe function as populations characterised by prefrontal cortical impairment, such as Parkinson's disease patients, have impairments in both processes (Abe et al., 2009; McNamara, Durso, Brown, & Lynch, 2003) . Counterfactual thinking therefore may represent an important process in the generation of lies.
Yet, despite the commonalities between counterfactual thinking and deception, few studies have assessed the potential link. So far studies show that counterfactual reflection can influence the perception of dishonesty (Miller, Visser, & Staub, 2005) and the likelihood of engaging in future unrelated unethical acts (Gaspar, Seabright, Reynolds, & Yam, 2015) . Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, and De Dreu (2011) also showed that observed alternatives can influence subsequent deception. In their study, participants were asked to declare the outcome of a die roll which only they could see and which determined the value of a monetary prize. Although they were asked to report only the outcome of their first die roll, when they were allowed to roll additional times, participants were more likely to lie. The observation of alternative desirable die rolls (higher than the one initially obtained) brought to mind events that almost happened, thus allowing participants to justify their deception. However in this study, individuals observed http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.003 0010-0277/Ó 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
